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MIROSLAV MARCOVICH
In his masterpiece, Refutotio omnium haeresium (written in Rome,
between a.d. 222 and 235), Hippolytus stresses the significance of
his own Theology, as opposed to countless heretical doctrines, and
especially to the Patripassianism of his archrival, Pope Callistus (Proem
6; X. 4; X. 5. I & 2; X. 31. 6 & 34. 1). He calls his own doctrine
Truth, and I think the term has a special meaning for him. In my
opinion, it stands for the Holy Ghost as the conveyer of God's truth
to man, as Spirit of truth, in one word, as Truth itself.' The suggested
interpretation seems to find support in Hippolytus himself.
Consider such expressions as these. (1) By simply appearing. Truth
will refute any heresy (X. 5. 1 ^ibvov (f)avelq eXey^eL rrju irXavqv)} (2)
Hippolytus' statement (Proem 7), "we proclaim whatever Truth has
ministered to men, after receiving it from the grace of the Father
{oaa ij aXrjdeLa virb rriq tov iraTpbq xocpi-Toq wapaXa^ovaa avOpwiroiq
dLTjKovrjae, ravra . . . Kr]pvaaon€u), is only a synonym for his preceding
expression (Proem 6), "we generously communicate to all whatever
has been offered by the Holy Ghost" {oaa irapex^L to ayiou irveviia
irocGLU a.4>dbv(jic, Kotuonvovvreq).
Hippolytus' True Doctrine comprises the three closing chapters
of his magnum opus (X. 32-34), as its Kopijoviq (X. 5. 2). His Theology
' Cf. G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford 1961), s.v. akrfitia, B, 4,
and ocvToaXrfitLa, 4.
^ The text is quoted from my edition of Hippolytus: Patristische Texte und Studien,
im Auftrage der Patristischen Kommission der Akademien der Wissenschaften in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland herausgegeben von K. Aland und E. Muhlenberg, Band
25 (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 1986).
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is highly elaborate, learned, and peculiar enough.' In this philosophical
volume of ICS, we shall limit ourselves to pointing out the main
philosophical sources of Hippolytus' inspiration. They are two—
Plato and Stoa.
Plato. According to Hippolytus, prior to the Creation, God first
conceives in his mind the ideas or forms of the future beings— ai
€v roj iraTpLKo) (I'oj) epporjdelaai ibiai (X. 33. 2). This act is called "the
Father's mental conception" (17 tov Trarpoq evvoLo). Now leaving apart
Greek antecedents of the term evvoia, I think the most likely sources
of Hippolytus' inspiration are Justin Martyr (1 Apology 64. 3 evvorjdevTa
TOV debv 61a: A670U TOV Koanov iroLrjoai) and especially the Valentinian
Gnostic Ptolemy, who is quoted by Hippolytus at Ref. VI. 38. 5.
According to Ptolemy, the Father (or Bythos) has two consorts,
dispositions or powers
—
"EvvoLav koX QeXrjaLV TrpCoTov yap evevorjOrj ti
irpo^aXelv, eVeira rjdeXrjae. Notice that both acts of the God creator—
Conception and Will— recur in Hippolytus' own Theology— oTe
(^avToq) rideXrjae ttouIv (X. 32. 1); oaa yovv rjdeXTjaev ttouIv 6 debq . . .;
OTe de (oaa) rj^deXrjaevy ox; rjdeXr^ae Kal eTToirjaev . . . (X. 33. 6-7); Abyoc,
iv eavTQ) (t)€p(jov to deXeLV tov yeyewqKOToc, (X. 33. 2); to aptoKov deo)
(ibid.).
^
As the next step, God creates the four basic principles (apxai) or
first substances {ai Trpajrat ovcriai) for the future beings— fire and
spirit {-Kvevna, not air), water and earth (X. 32. 2 and 33. 4). According
to Hippolytus, beings are made either out of a single substance (toc
fiovoovaia) or a combination of the four elements. This process of
combination is called "binding a living organism together" {avvbtanoc,,
X. 32. 2), and is most probably Platonic in origin (compare, e.g.,
Tim. 73 b 3 ^ 'A^X^ t^ aoonaTi (rvvdovnevq; Symp. 202 e 6 ojare to ttocv
avTO avTw avvbtbtadaL).
Following this theory of "fastening the elements in a whole (an
organism)," Hippolytus concludes that only the beings made out of
one single substance are imperishable, since they cannot be "undone"
— Ka\ TO. pikv f'l hoc, adavaTa rjv {Xvaiq yap (avTolq) ov irapaKoXovdet'
TO yap (V ov XvdrjaeTaL irooiroTe), to. be Ik bvo rj Tpidv r) Teaaapo^v Xvtol.
bib /cat dvqTO. ovona^eTai' davaToq yap tovto KeKXrjTaL, 17 tu)v bebep,ev(j)v
XvaLc, (X. 32. 3).
Now, the idea that all which has been fastened together may be
undone and perish, is Platonic. Compare, e.g., Tim. 41 a 7 to p-ev
ovv 5r} bedev irav XvTbv. I need not engage here in the discussion about
^ On Hippolytus' Theology compare M. Richard, in Dictionnaire de Spiritualite,
44-45 (Paris 1968), s.v. Hippolyte de Rome, pp. 545-571; L. Bertsch, Die Botschaft
vom Christus und unserer Erlosung bei Hippolyt von Rom (Augsburg 1966).
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whether Hippolytus is consistent in his theory. Briefly stated, I think
he is consistent but elliptical {Uavov ovv vvv (ioTi Tama) toIc, €u
4>povo\)aLV airoKeKpiadaL . . . to bl vvv Uavov (boKu) eivai (Kdeadai Taq
aiViat;, X. 32. 4-5). Presumably, the only being composed of one
single substance is the Holy Ghost (Uvevna). Jesus, the Logos, consists
of the divine substance of the Father {ovaia vivapx<^v deov, X. 33. 8).
Sun, moon and the stars are made of fire and spirit, thus perishable.
So is the world (6 6t Koafioq . . . tViSexfToii Kal Xvcnv, X. 33. 8). If my
restoration of the corrupt text is correct, the angels too are made of
fire and spirit (compare OT Psalm 103:4 and Gregory Naz. Oral,
theol. 28. 31 and 31. 15). Consequently, they too are potentially
perishable. Finally, when Hippolytus states that fish and birds are
made of water, while reptiles, beasts and other animals are made of
earth, I think we should understand, ''primarily of water or earth,
respectively." For, evidently, the animals are not to. p-ovoovaia and
thus imperishable.
Man is created out of all four elements— e'/c iraoO^v (xvvdeToq ovolCov
(X. 33. 7). This idea too is Platonic. Compare Tim. 42 e - 43 a, and
Albinus clearly states, ol b\ Seol eivXaaav nlv Trporjyovp.€v<ji)<; tov avOpo^irov
eK yriq Kal -Kvpoc, Kal aepoq Kal vbaToq {Epitome 17. 1, ed. Hermann,
Plato vol. VI, p. 172).
A third encounter of Hippolytus with Platonism seems to occur
in his reinterpretation of the Delphic injunction, TvCidi aeavTov (quoted
at I. 18), in the sense of, "Man, recognize that thou art godlike''—
(^Kaiy tovt' ((ttl TO ''yvcbdL aeavTOV,'' eTriy vovc, (eV a-eauro)) tov ire-KonqKOTa
dibv (X. 34. 4). Doubtless, Hippolytus is building upon OT Genesis
1:26 (referred to at X. 34. 5)— Man is made in God's image and
likeness. But there is no injunction, "Know thyself," in the Old
Testament. On the other hand, a reinterpretation of the Tvibdi aeavTov
in the sense of TvcbdL to deiov iv aeavTo: is to be found in the first
Alcibiades 133 c 4— "Then this part of the soul resembles God, and
he who looks at this part, having realized all things divine, will be
most likely to know himself" (To? ^co) apa tovt' eoiKev avTriq, Kai tk;
€LC, TOVTO ^XeiTd^v Kal irav to delov yvovq, . . . ovtoo Kal eavTov av yvoii)
p,a\L(JTa).
In conclusion, throughout the Elenchos, Hippolytus dismisses Pla-
to's pagan philosophy—and he calls Valentinus HXaToiviKo:;, ov
XptaTLavbq (VI. 29. 1)— only to succumb to the Platonic spell in his
own Theology, as did Athenagoras half a century before him.
Stoa. Hippolytus' Christology displays a peculiar blend of Stoic and
Christian ideas. Contrary to the doctrine of Noetus and Callistus,
according to Hippolytus the Son does not coexist with the Father,
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but is being first mentally conceived and then born by the Father as
any other being
—
OvToq ovv (o) fiouoq . . . debq Abyov irpOiTov evvorjddq
ctTToyevva (X. 33. 1). The only difference of significance between the
"first-born" son (NT Col. 1:15) and the rest of the creatures is in
the fact that the Son consists of pure being, i.e., of the same substance
as the Father (tovtov (ouy) novov e^ ovtcjov eyevva' to yap bv ambc, b
Trarrjp tjv, e^ ov to yevprjdep, X. 33. 1; 6 Abyoq . . . ovoia uvrapxcoi' diov,
X. 33. 8), while the rest of the beings are made out of one or more
of the four basic elements.
The "first-born" Son exists in the Father as his immanent reasoning
about the universe {ov (Sf) kbyov ice, (poourjv, aXX' evbicedeTov tov iravTbq
XoyKTIxbv, X. 33. 1). When the Father decides to create the world,
presumably, he opens his mouth, and his imvianent reasoning {IvbLadeToc,
Xbyoq) becomes at once an uttered Word {Trpo(f)opLKbq Xbyoq). It is this
uttered Word that becomes the Father's only agent of Creation— koI
aiTLOv Tolq yivon'ivoLc, Kbyoq 7]v (X. 33. 2); iva Kbyoc, virovpyy (33. 4);
bcra yovv rjdeXijaev iroulv b debq, Tama A67CO ibrjfiiovpyei (33. 6); Ttt^Ora)
be -KOLVTa biwKei b Abyoc, b deov (33. 1 1). Hippolytus' elliptic account is
perhaps best illustrated by the Christology of Theophilus of Antioch
{Ad Autolycum II. 10 & 22): "Excof ovv b debq tov eavTov Xbyov ivbiadeTov
ev Tolc, ibiotq awXayxfOLq (cf. OT Psalm 109:3), eyevvrjaev ambv . . .;
b-KbTt be rjdeXrjaev b debq iroifiaai baa IfiovXevaaTo, tovtov tov Xbyov
eyevvrjaev Kpo(t)opiKbv, ''irpoiTbTOKOv rraarjq KTLoeooq . . ." (NT Col. 1:15).
Now, the distinction between the two kinds of Logos— "mental
reasoning" {evbtadeToq) and "uttered word" {Kpo4>opLKb<^— is clearly
Stoic,^ with possible antecedents in Plato {Sophist 263 e) and Aristotle
(e.g.. Anal. Post. A 10, p. 76 b 25). But, as the examples of Theophilus,
Irenaeus {Adv. haer. II. 12. 5), or Origen {Contra Celsum VI. 65) show,
it was well established in the time of Hippolytus.^
The problem, however, is in the function of the Logos as a Voice
{(f)u)vr{). We can understand that a Stoic Tvpo(t)opLKbc, Xbyoc, is no other
thing but an uttered voice, or, as Hippolytus puts it,— 6 Abyoq b
deov . . ., 17 Tpb eo)a(t>bpov (f)o)a(f)bpoq 0aji'T7 (X. 33. II); {Xaoq) virb Abyov
(Ixjovriq fir] KaTaXaix(j)dev (X. 34. 2); (f)(x)vr]v (pdeyybfievoc, Kal (t>(bq eK (fxjOToq
yevvCiv Tcpor)Kev ttj KTiaei Kvpiov tov ibiov vovv {Contra Noetum 10, p.
253. 5 Nautin; cf. NT II Petri 1:19).
We can also understand that Logos serves as a "voice of God" to
men (Adam, the prophets and others). Consider, e.g., X. 33. 13 Kal
' Cf., e.g., Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa^ I (Gouingen 1959), pp. 39; 185; 373 ff.; 412;
435; 451.— II (Gottingen 1955), Erlauterungen.
' It suffices here to refer to M. Muhl, in Archivfur Begriffsgeschichte (Bonn, Bouvier),
VII (1962), 7-56.
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ravra (Se) 6 debq (KeXeve Aoyo}, 6 8e Abyoq i({)deyyeTO Xeycov (^tolc,
Trpo(t>r]Tai<;y . . ., or Theophilus (II. 22) '0 be Xbyoq avrov, 5i' ov to.
KOLVTa ireiroirjKep, . . . apaXan^avo)^ to irpoaojirov tov irarpoq, . . . oiiroq
co/xiXeL Tip 'Adaix. . . . (pwurj 8i tl aXXo IotXv aXX' rj b Xbyoc, b tov deoi),
bq iffTLU Kal vlbq avTov;
What is peculiar in Hippolytus' Christology is the fact that Logos
bears in himself the Father's ideas as a voice— afxa yap ro) e'/c tov
ytpurjCFavToq irpoeXddv . . . (b^q) (i>(j^vr]v etx^v ev eavTU) Tocq eu tu) xarpi-
Ko) (j^o)) evvor]deiaaq ibeaq (X. 33. 2). If I understand Hippolytus
correctly, he is trying to tell us that Logos is fulfilling his Demiurgical
duty by transforming the Father's immanent ideas into uttered words.
How can we explain such a function of Logos? Certainly we are not
dealing here with the folkloric motif of the creation of the world by
a Demiurge's sound of music. Nor is it likely that Logos brings beings
into existence simply by naming them, by giving them a name (in
the sense of Basilides' ovbuaTi nop<t)ovv, Ref. VII. 18. 1). For we learn
from Hippolytus himself that the naming of the beings did not
coincide with their very creation— OTe be (oaa) r)(diXr]otvy Icq rjOeXirjae
Kol €TroLr](T€P, bvbfiaatv (^avTO) KoXiaaq ear]iir}vev (X. 33. 7).
Since no Stoic theory of language seems to be of avail in our case,
the only suggestion I am at present able to offer is that Logos
transforms the Father's ideas into voice in his role of the traditional
Old Testament "voice of God^ Compare, e.g., OT Genesis 1:3 kol
eiirev b debq- TevrjdrjTijo <t>0)q. Kal iyevtTo (i>u)q, with Basilides' interpretation
{Ref. VII. 22. 3), ov yap yeypairTai irbdeu yeyove to <j)oiq, aXX' avTO
nbvov (to yevbfievovy eK Triq 4>o:)vf)q tov XeyovToq. . . . Or Hippolytus
{Contra Noetum 10) Qebq ixbvoq UTrapxcof Kal fxr]b\v e'xcoj' iavTcx) ovyxpovov
€^ovXr]6r} Koop-ov KTiaar bq Kbopov evvorjddq deXrjaaq Te Kal (l)dey^aiJ.ei'oq
e-Koir](Tev.
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